"No" to Foreign Telecoms Equals "No" to the New Economy! by Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Edward M. Graham
tition between privately-owned US telecom
firms and publicly-owned foreign firms. To
put the debate in a sound bite, “How can a
private firm compete with a government
wallet?”
But even at the sound bite level, it’s
wrong to characterize Deutsche Telecom as
an extension of the German government’s
wallet. Deutsche Telecom is now 42 percent
privately owned (US investors own approxi-
mately 20 percent of all privately held
Deutsche Telecom shares). Acquisition of
VoiceStream by Deutsche Telecom,
through a share exchange, will increase
the private ownership of Deutsche Telecom
to 55 percent. The German Federal Govern-
ment is already a largely passive investor,
holding no “golden share” in Deutsche
Telecom and only one of 20 board seats; in
fact, the German government plans to sell
off the rest of Deutsche Telecom as fast as
market conditions permit. Deutsche
Telecom enjoys no special tax breaks. Nor
can it borrow from the German Finance
Ministry. Indicative of the arm’s length re-
lation between Deutsche Telecom and the
German government is that the Standard
& Poor’s credit rating for Deutsche Telecom
is AA- (the same as AT&T, SBC, and
BellSouth), while the German sovereign
rating is AAA.
If Hollings prevails in his campaign to



















Within a few weeks, the United States
will make a pivotal decision—whether to
prohibit foreign telecommunications firms
that are partly owned by foreign govern-
ments from competing in the US market.
The decisive case is Deutsche Telecom’s
bid to acquire the US mobile telephone op-
erator VoiceStream (and VoiceStream’s
own new acquisition, PowerTel).
Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) is doing
everything he can to stop the German
telecom giant. Along with 29 Senate co-
sponsors, Hollings has introduced a bill (S.
2793) that would block Deutsche Telecom,
or any other telecom owned more than 25
percent by a foreign government, from ac-
quiring a US telecom firm. S. 2793 may not
pass, but to reinforce their objections,
Senator Hollings and the 29 other senators
wrote a stern letter to William Kennard,
Chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), urging the FCC to block
the acquisition. Hollings worries about what
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Americans will be certain losers—all US consumers
and most US telecom companies. Potential corporate
winners may be lurking in the background, but so
far they have kept out of sight.
To understand why the Hollings initiative can in-
flict so much damage, and finds so little support among
US telecom firms, let alone US consumers, it’s useful
to start with a short background on telecom econom-
ics.
Telecom Economics
The telecommunications industry—once a staid
investment for widows and orphans—is simulta-
neously going through two revolutions. These are al-
most the industrial equivalent of the American and
French Revolutions happening simultaneously. On
the one hand, the industry is being rocked by an ex-
plosion of new technology and applications of this
technology—digital, mobile/PCS, broadband trans-
mission, internet, e-commerce and more. On the
other hand, there’s the dramatic introduction of com-
petition into what was once a near-monopoly indus-
try, not only in the United States but everywhere else
as well. Working together, technology and competi-
tion have made telecommunications the main en-
gine driving the information technology revolution.
Once telecommunications was largely about calling
mother on Sunday night. But now telecommunica-
tion networks have become the muscles that drive
the “new economy”. When these muscles work well,
we see the economic equivalent of an Olympic
marathoner; when they work poorly, we see the once-
a-month jogger.
Network Economics
But there’s another dimension to the story—net-
work economics. A telecom network becomes expo-
nentially more valuable when more companies,
people, and services are connected to that network.
Thus, a network with 50 million customers is twice
the size but many more times the value of a net-
work with 25 million customers.
The value of a network to a telecom firm in-
creases faster than its size because the marginal
cost of adding additional subscribers and services is
a fraction of the fixed cost of building the backbone
of the network. This is why Deutsche Telecom can
bid roughly $51 billion for VoiceStream, more than
$15,000 per customer. Voice Stream (in combina-
tion with PowerTel) is only the sixth largest telecom
nationwide, with around 3 million existing custom-
ers. Potentially, however, it could serve nearly 250
million Americans. As it expands in the rapidly grow-
ing US wireless market, with finance and technol-
ogy from Deutsche Telecom, the cost of serving addi-
tional customers will fall dramatically.
Importantly, the value of the service provided by
the network to the customer also increases expo-
nentially with the size of the network. Thus, for ex-
ample, both modern e-mail and traditional voice te-
lephony are of great value to the user because both
can be used to reach millions of other users. If the
number of persons connected to the network were
small, the value of being connected would also be
small. (For this reason, telecom firms interconnect
their networks, so a customer of one network can
reach customers on other networks.)
Thus, the larger a network, the more valuable it
becomes to its business and household users, be-
cause they enjoy a seamless reach to more firms,
people and places. And this value is increasing as
the result of new technology: For example, technol-
ogy has enabled households to add broadband com-
puter connections at low cost to their basic telecom-
munications service. With this connection, they can
access foreign Web sites and even order merchan-
dise from abroad. Business firms can link their re-
mote offices and factories using customized voice,
video, sound and data facilities.
The Urge to Merge
Network economics are a supercharged variant
of economies of scale. Every student who passes Eco-
nomics 101 can predict the outcome in an industry
that is characterized by powerful economies of scale.
Firms will merge in order to reduce costs. If carried
too far, of course, these combinations could lead to
one firm that monopolizes the industry. But that out-
come seems remote in telecommunications. Rather,
firms are entering what once used to be another
firm’s exclusive market simply to remain competi-
tive. This is happening on a world scale. US firms
are the most aggressive players in this global game:
Five of the world’s top ten telecom firms are based
in the United States—and they are growing like
kudzu in every corner of the globe. Four foreign firms,
with substantial government ownership, are also in
the top ten—NTT (Japan), Deutsche Telecom, France
Telecom, and Telecom Italia. Telefonica (Spain) is
close behind.
The Deutsche Telecom acquisition of
VoiceStream (and Powertel) exemplifies the sort of
horizontal expansion that adds to competition in the
U.S. market. Deutsche Telecom, like most other for-
eign carriers (Mannesmann/Vodaphone is an ex-
ception), has no significant presence in the US mar-
ket. If Deutsche Telecom makes an entry, it will
add to competition. VoiceStream can potentially
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serve nearly all American households. But
VoiceStream is now the sixth largest player in the
US market. Unless it combines with another player,
it won’t have the capital and technology to expand
and compete. And with Verizon, SBC, BellSouth,
AT&T and Sprint already nationwide carriers, un-
less VoiceStream combines with a carrier not already
in the US market, a VoiceStream merger is likely to
subtract competition.
Pro-competitive Regulation
While the Deutsche Telecom acquisition poten-
tially adds to competition in the US market, that isn’t
necessarily true of all telecom mergers and acquisi-
tions. Indeed, there’s an obvious tension between the
network cost reduction enabled by consolidation and
expansion and the price benefits of wide-open com-
petition. All telecom companies would go broke if com-
petition drove prices down to the level of marginal
costs for their services. If prices were to equal mar-
ginal costs, the firms would never recover the huge
fixed costs of investment that go into setting up fiber
optic connections, wireless relay stations, and the
development of new technology. On the other hand,
consumers would be short-changed if there was not
enough competition to drive prices down to the level
of average costs. When prices do equal average costs,
firms can recoup the fixed costs of creating networks,
including those of developing innovative technologies,
while customers receive maximum value from us-
ing the network.
There are two ways of reconciling the age-old co-
nundrum between industrial consolidation and en-
suring that prices approach average cost. The old-
fashioned way is detailed price and entry regulation,
service-by-service, customer-by-customer, region-by-
region. The problem with price and entry regulation
is that it usually gets captured by lawyers in the pay
of telecom firms. They do their best to establish mo-
nopoly practices under the cloak of public oversight.
Once captured, price and entry regulation can be used
to create undesirable barriers to innovation and new
players.
The newer reconciliation, now practiced world-
wide, is to welcome the widest number of firms into
the market, and regulate the industry in a pro-com-
petitive manner to ensure that incumbents don’t
block innovation and new entrants. The free-for-all
of the market then drives down prices. That was
Judge Harold Greene’s strategy when he broke up
AT&T in 1982, and it has since become the guiding
star of FCC policy. The pro-competitive strategy has
in fact delivered a more abundant economic cornu-
copia than anyone twenty years ago could have ex-
pected.
The newer reconciliation has delivered powerful
benefits to US consumers. A great example is mo-
bile telephony—VoiceStream’s business. Until 1995,
every regional market had only two mobile telephone
operators—the regional bell operating company and
the winner of the FCC’s cellular license lottery. New
competitors began to enter the market in 1995. Now,
nearly 70 percent of American households are served
by at least five mobile operators. The result: between
1994 and 2000, average mobile telephone rates were
slashed from 57 cents a minute to 24 cents a minute.
As this example illustrates, it takes at least five play-
ers in the market to ensure that competition will
drive prices down towards average cost.
So where can a new competitor like VoiceStream
go to seek a large partner with the financial re-
sources to expand its wireless business? And where
can the United States find new players for other
niches in the burgeoning telecom market? The
United States has reached a point where it actually
needs entry by big foreign players—companies like
NTT, Deutsche Telecom and France Telecom—to
provide the financial clout to ensure that the com-
petitive benefits of cheap telecommunications reach
American consumers in each and every niche of the
market.
Aha! But can competition really be fair when a
foreign government owns one of the players? That’s
the nub of Senator Hollings’ campaign against
Deutsche Telecom and other government-owned
telecoms, like NTT and France Telecom, that want
to buy into the US market.
What About Government Ownership?
Twenty years ago, virtually all telecom compa-
nies were either regulated private monopolies (like
AT&T), or government corporations, like Deutsche
Telecom. They kept each other at arm’s length,
charged stiff interconnection rates for transmitting
voice or data to local customers from foreign carri-
ers, and blocked the entry by newcomers who wanted
to offer cheaper long distance, wireless service, or
user hardware like office switchboards. The main
complaint against government ownership was that
it served to block entry into the telecommunications
sector and keep prices far higher than necessary.
But all this has changed. Through privatization
and pro-competitive regulation, telecom companies
in Europe are being forced to shed their monopoly
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 vestiges in favor of slugging it out in the market-
place. The pro-competitive regulatory approach has
many elements, pioneered in concept by Judge
Greene and the FCC in the United States during the
1980s, expanded by Congress in the 1996 Telecom-
munications Act, and adopted internationally by the
World Trade Organization in the 1997 Basic Telecom
Agreement.
Thus, other countries are restructuring their
telecom industries, and not just to accommodate
US wishes. Instead, a stark realization is driving
the shakeup of ancient telecom monopolies: No
country has a prayer of prospering in the new
economy without innovative and competitive
telecom service providers that provide the latest
and best technologies to customers at the lowest
possible cost.
Of the two ingredients of the new telecom indus-
try outside the United States, privatization and pro-
competitive regulation, the latter is in fact the most
important. Some countries—Mexico and Singapore
being just two examples—privatized their public
telecom carriers without implementing pro-competi-
tive regulation. In particular, the telecom firms were
protected from foreign competition. The result? A high
value for shares when the public telecoms were sold,
but also high rates and low innovation for customers
in the years thereafter. In fact, Mexico and Singapore,
under these policies, did not fully participate in the
benefits of the new economy.
By contrast, most European countries have em-
braced pro-competitive regulation, while gradually
privatizing their telecom sectors. Britain led the way
when it privatized British Telecom and followed up
with pro-competitive regulation that opened the way
for entry of new carriers. Germany is on the same
path. More importantly, Germany has implemented
all the elements of pro-competitive regulation con-
tained in the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement. Entry
by new service providers in Germany now is allowed
and, indeed, one result has been that long distance
and international rates have dropped by more than
70 percent. Nearly 150 carriers now offer local ser-
vice. Four competitors are fighting for the mobile
market. Deutsche Telecom in fact is only the sec-
ond largest mobile operator in Germany. Leading US
companies hold stakes in the German market: AT&T,
WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing and many others.
German Internet density is fast approaching US lev-
els, with 20 million subscribers by the end of 2000.
America Online is the second largest Internet ser-
vice provider in Germany.
Why American Consumers Lose under Hollings
American consumer interest is plain and simple.
The larger the number of telecom giants operating in
the US market, the keener the competition, the lower
the prices, the faster the innovation—all propelling the
new economy. If the Congress passes the Hollings bill,
or if the FCC uses its existing statutory powers to block
Deutsche Telecom’s acquisition of VoiceStream, that
will send a powerful message: Foreigners keep out until
you are 75 percent privatized!
Privatization is certainly desirable. It’s already
happening in Europe, Japan and elsewhere. Hollings
worries that the pace of privatization is too slow. But
to block entry into the US market by foreign telecom
firms until they are 75 percent privatized is impa-
tience with a vengeance! In another five to ten years,
nearly all these foreign firms will indeed be priva-
tized to Hollings’ 75 percent threshold. But in the
meantime, American consumers will lose the ben-
efit of stronger competition. And with the US telecom
market more mature and expanding less rapidly five
or ten years hence, it will be much harder for a new-
comer to build a big enough customer base to cover
the fixed costs of entry. Under the Hollings bill, US
consumers will long be denied the benefits of addi-
tional competition from firms like Deutsche Telecom,
France Telecom, NTT and others.
Why US Telecoms Lose under Hollings
Outside the United States and a few other na-
tions, in practically every country, battles are con-
stantly being fought between those who advocate
telecom competition and innovation, and incumbent
telecom operators who would rather do things their
way at their time. In these battles, US telecom firms
are agents of change. They are bursting into mar-
kets everywhere, foremost in Europe. From the
standpoint of Europe’s own self interest in its tran-
sition to the new economy, it should welcome AT&T,
MCI Worldcom, SBC, Verizon, and all the rest of the
American pack—whatever the outcome of Senator
Hollings’ efforts.
But let’s be realistic. If Deutsche Telecom is
blocked, the status quo forces in Europe and else-
where will learn by bad example: They will find new
reasons to block US telecom expansion. US telecom
firms would then be big time losers. But so will US
consumers. Households and firms that are seeking
low cost, seamless, high-quality connections to Eu-
rope could, in many instances, be disappointed.
What if Hollings is Right?
Despite everything in the WTO Basic Telecom
Agreement and German actions, Hollings could still
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be right to worry about a government-controlled player
in the US telecom market. After all, Deutsche
Telecom, like AT&T, enjoys the advantages that go
with 100 years as the incumbent carrier. In opaque
ways, Deutsche Telecom might use these advantages
to keep prices high and innovation low in Germany,
while applying the profits to enlarge its foothold in
the US market—by offering bargains to the
VoiceStream customers. In a word, what if Deutsche
Telecom behaves like a predator? This scenario ap-
pears to have no factual basis in Deutsche Telecom’s
case, but it cannot be dismissed as a mere theoreti-
cal concern.
Fortunately, the United States has instruments
besides the blunt Hollings bill to address this con-
cern. Exercising its statutory authority, the FCC can
condition approval of the VoiceStream acquisition on
appropriate benchmarks of Deutsche Telecom opera-
tions, not only in the United States but also in Ger-
many. The U.S. president—acting under the Exon-
Florio act, administered by the Treasury-chaired
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States, CFIUS—can block or modify the acquisition
if it poses a national security concern. Once the ac-
quisition is complete, the FCC can continue to moni-
tor the operations of Deutsche Telecom and
VoiceStream in the US market. And, importantly,
the Department of Justice can take remedial ac-
tion if Deutsche Telecom, through VoiceStream,
behaves as a predator and attempts to establish a
monopoly by doing harm to its domestically-owned
competitors. In short, the United States already has
in place an array of means by which it can deal with
Deutsche Telecom—if it actually behaves as Sena-
tor Hollings fears.
To enact the Hollings bill is to shout a triple “No!”:
“No” to foreign competition, “No” to American con-
sumers, and “No” to US telecom firms. To shout this
triple “No” is tantamount to shouting “No” to the new
economy and the prosperity it is bringing.